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Abstract—The increased need for unattended authentication in
multiple scenarios has motivated a wide deployment of biometric
systems in the last few years. This has in turn led to the
disclosure of security concerns specifically related to biometric
systems. Among them, Presentation Attacks (PAs, i.e., attempts
to log into the system with a fake biometric characteristic or
presentation attack instrument) pose a severe threat to the
security of the system: any person could eventually fabricate or
order a gummy finger or face mask to impersonate someone else.
The biometrics community has thus made a considerable effort
to the development of automatic Presentation Attack Detection
(PAD) mechanisms, for instance through the international LivDet
competitions.
In this context, we present a novel fingerprint PAD scheme
based on i) a new capture device able to acquire images
within the short wave infrared (SWIR) spectrum, and ii) an
in-depth analysis of several state-of-the-art techniques based on
both handcrafted and deep learning features. The approach is
evaluated on a database comprising over 4700 samples, stemming
from 562 different subjects and 35 different presentation attack
instrument (PAI) species. The results show the soundness of the
proposed approach with a detection equal error rate (D-EER) as
low as 1.36% even in a realistic scenario where five different PAI
species are considered only for testing purposes (i.e., unknown
attacks).
Index Terms—Presentation Attack Detection, Biometrics, Deep
Learning, CNN, SWIR, Fingerprint
I. INTRODUCTION
There is an increasing demand in the current society
for automatic and reliable authentication of individuals in a
wide number of scenarios. To address this need, biometric
recognition systems based on the individuals’ biological (e.g.,
iris or fingerprint) or behavioural (e.g., signature or voice)
characteristics have been consolidated as a reliable paradigm in
the last decades. Its advantages over traditional authentication
methods (e.g., no need to carry tokens or remember passwords,
they are harder to circumvent and provide at the same time a
stronger link between the subject and the action or event), have
allowed a wide deployment of biometric systems, including
large-scale national and international initiatives such as the
Unique ID program of the Indian government [1] or the Smart
Border project of the European Comission [2].
In spite of their numerous advantages, biometric systems
are vulnerable to external attacks as any other security-related
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technology. Among all possible attack points defined in [3]–
[5], the biometric capture device is probably the most exposed
one: an eventual attacker requires no knowledge about the
inner functioning of the system in order to launch an attack
and break the system. Instead, he/she can simply present the
capture device with a presentation attack instrument (PAI),
such as a gummy finger or a fingerprint overlay, in order to
interfere with its intended behaviour. The main goal might
be to impersonate someone else (i.e., active impostor) or to
avoid being recognised (i.e., identity concealer). These attacks
are known in the ISO/IEC 30107 [5] as presentation attacks
(PAs).
Given the severe security threat posed by such PAs, the
development of automatic techniques which are able to distin-
guish between bona fide (i.e., real or live) presentations and
access attempts carried out by means of PAIs has become of
the utmost importance [6], [7]. Referred to as presentation
attack detection (PAD) methods, research in this area has
been recently funded by several international projects like
the European Tabula Rasa [8] and BEAT [9], or the more
recent US ODIN research program [10]. Together with the
organisation of the LivDet – liveness detection competition
series on iris and fingerprint [11], [12], where the number
of participants has been increasing year after year (up to 17
algorithms submitted in 2017), these initiatives have fostered
a considerable number of publications on PAD for different
biometric characteristics, including iris [13], fingerprint [14],
[15], face [16], or handwritten signature [17].
The initial approaches to PAD were based on the so-
called handcrafted features, such as texture descriptors or
motion analysis [6], [18]. However, in the last years deep
learning (DL) has become a thriving topic [19]–[21], and
biometric recognition in general, and PAD in particular, are
not an exception. DL allows expert systems to learn from
experience and understand the world in terms of a hierarchy
of simpler units, thereby enabling significant advances in
complex domains. The main reasons to understand its high
deployment lie on the increasing amount of available data
and the evolution of graphical processing units (GPU), which
in turn allows the successful training of deep architectures.
However, the belief that DL schmes can be only used for
tasks with massive amounts of available data is changing
thanks to the development of pre-trained models. This transfer
learning concept refers to network models that are trained for a
given task with large available databases, including any kind
of images and not only those expected for the problem at
hand. Those models are subsequently retrained (a.k.a. fine-
tuned, adapted) for a different task for which data are usually
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2scarce.
All the aforementioned advances have allowed the deploy-
ment of DL architectures in many different fields, including
biometric recognition [22], [23]. More specifically, convo-
lutional neural networks (CNNs) and deep belief networks
(DBNs) have been used for fingerprint PAD purposes, based
either on the complete fingerprint samples [24]–[26] or on a
patch-wise manner [27]–[29].
As it will be described in more detail in Sect. III, DL
based PAD approaches have boosted the performance over
common PAD benchmarks from the LivDet competitions,
achieving detection rates over 90%. Such high accuracy rates
indicate the valuable contributions of the existing approaches.
However, the LivDet databases comprise altogether up to 11
different materials for the fabrication of PAIs, even if the
choice for the attacker is much wider based on commercial
products readily available even online. As a consequence, other
databases, comprising a larger number of materials for the
fabrication of the PAIs, should be explored. Very few works
have considered this issue, including a database comprising
over twelve different PAI species in [29], and 21 materials in
[30]. We address this issue with the acquisition of a database
including 35 different PAI species, within the US ODIN
research program [10].
In addition, one question that remains mostly unanswered is
the following one: Once a artificial neural network is trained
on a large number of PAI species, will unknown attacks also be
detected? The evaluation carried out in [30] has shown that the
error rates were multiplied by a factor of six when unknown
PAI species are tested, with respect to the detection accuracy
reached on known attacks. Therefore, we can conclude that
additional research efforts are needed in this area. To further
tackle these issues and in order to reach robustness to unknown
attacks, some researchers have considered other sources of
information different from traditional capture devices [13],
[15]. More specifically, the use of multi-spectral near infrared
(NIR) technologies has been studied for face [31], [32] and
fingerprint [33], [34].
In this new context, a recent trend for both biometric
PAD and face recognition enhancement is based on skin
detection. On the one hand, non-skin materials (e.g., a mask
or a scarf) can be masked for recognition purposes. On the
other hand, such materials can be considered an attempt of
a PA. This will be the fundamental idea followed in this
article: PAD is regarded as the problem of discriminating
skin vs. non-skin materials. In order to overcome one of the
main challenges of skin detection, namely, the plurality of
different skin colours [35], we choose the short wave in-
frared (SWIR) band as a promising information source. It has
been shown that human skin shows characteristic remission
properties for multi-spectral SWIR wavelengths, which are
independent of a capture subject’s age, gender or skin type
[36]. In fact, several approaches have been proposed for face
recognition in the infrared domain [37], [38]. In particular, for
surveillance purposes, the SWIR range has been analysed by
several research groups, either as solely source of information
or in combination with visible light images [39]–[41]. The
advantages of SWIR are mostly its robustness in challenging
environmental conditions (e.g., with fog or at night time). In
addition, the benefits of multi-spectral hand based recognition
within the SWIR bands were studied in [42], where the authors
outperformed state-of-the-art recognition approaches.
For the particular task of PAD, the characteristic remission
properties of the human skin observed in the multi-spectral
SWIR band were exploited in [32] for facial PAD, achieving
a 99% detection accuracy. A similar approach was analysed in
[43] over a small fingerprint database, comprising 60 samples.
It was shown that the method was able to detect all 12 PAIs
except for one. In addition, a preliminary DL approach based
on a pre-trained CNN was tested on the same database in [44],
achieving perfect detection rates over the small preliminary
database.
Keeping these thoughts in mind, we propose in this work a
biometric presentation attack detection method based on SWIR
images and state-of-the-art CNN architectures, as depicted in
Fig. 1. Both networks trained from scratch (i.e., a residual
network [45]) and also pre-trained models (i.e., MobileNet
[46] and VGG19 [47]) have been analysed. In addition, two
different approaches have been studied: i) using the CNNs
as an end-to-end solution, and ii) utilising the CNNs as a
feature extractor and carrying out classification with support
vector machines (SVMs). The results obtained are compared
to the handcrafted feature extraction approach proposed in
[43]. Then, a final fusion of the different single algorithms is
also explored for completeness. The experimental evaluation is
carried out on a database captured within the BATL project of
the ODIN Program, which includes more than 4700 samples
and 35 different PAI species. Over this database, under the un-
kown attack scenario, a Detection Equal Error Rate (D-EER)
of 1.36% has been achieved, thereby proving the soundness
of the proposed approach.
It should be finally noted that, being a skin detection based
method, the proposed PAD technique can be applied not only
to fingerprints but also to other biometric characteristics, such
as the face, the hand, or the periocular regions.
The main contributions of this article can be summarised as
follows:
• Review of the state-of-the-art on fingerprint PAD based
on either i) non-conventional capture devices, or ii)
traditional sensors and deep learning approaches.
• Evaluation of multiple state-of-the-art CNN architectures,
using both pre-trained models and training the networks
from scratch. The CNNs are evaluated as wither end-
to-end solutions or alternatively as feature extractors in
combination with SVMs.
• Benchmark of deep learning approaches with high-
performing handcrafted features [43].
• Fusion of handcrafted and deep learning features on
SWIR images.
• Detection performance evaluation on a large database
comprising 35 different PAIs and over 4700 samples.
• Detection performance evaluation including unknown at-
tacks, achieving a state-of-the-art detection performance.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Sect. II
presents the main terms which will be used in the remainder of
the article. Related works on fingerprint PAD are summarised
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Fig. 1: General diagram of the PAD method proposed. On the left hand, the capture device acquires the samples at four
different wavelengths within the SWIR spectrum. On the right hand, several software approaches have been proposed, namely:
i) three different state-of-the-art CNN architectures have been tested as an end-to-end solution, ii) the features output by the
CNNs have been used to feed an SVM, iii) handcrafted features (i.e., spectral signatures) have been extracted, and iv) a final
fusion of the aforementioned algorithms has been evaluated for completeness.
in Sect. III. Sects. IV and Sect. V describe the proposed
approach. The evaluation framework is presented in Sect. VI,
and the results discussed in Sect. VII. Final conclusions are
drawn in Sect. VIII.
II. DEFINITIONS
In the following, we include the main definitions stated
within the ISO/IEC 30107-3 standard on biometric presenta-
tion attack detection - part 3: testing and reporting [48], which
will be used throughout the article:
Bona fide presentation: “interaction of the biometric cap-
ture subject and the biometric data capture subsystem in the
fashion intended by the policy of the biometric system”. That
is, a normal or genuine presentation.
Presentation attack (PA): “presentation to the biometric
data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the
operation of the biometric system”. That is, an attack carried
out on the capture device to either conceal your identity or
impersonate someone else.
Presentation attack instrument (PAI): “biometric charac-
teristic or object used in a presentation attack”. For instance,
a silicone 3D mask or an ecoflex fingerprint overlay.
PAI species: “class of presentation attack instruments
created using a common production method and based on
different biometric characteristics”.
In order to evaluate the vulnerabilities of biometric systems
to PAs, the following metrics should be used:
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER):
“proportion of attack presentations using the same PAI species
incorrectly classified as bona fide presentations in a specific
scenario”.
Bona fide Presentation Classification Error Rate
(BPCER): “proportion of bona fide presentations incorrectly
classified as presentation attacks in a specific scenario”.
Derived from the aforementioned metrics, the detection
equal error rate (D-ERR) is defined as the error rate at the
operating point where APCER = BPCER.
III. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we summarise the key works on fingerprint
PAD for both non-conventional optical or capacitive sensors
(see Sect. III-A and Table I) and using DL approaches on
conventional sensors (see Sect. III-B and Table II). For further
details on fingerprint PAD, the reader is referred to [14], [15].
It should be noted that, in addition to the metrics defined
in Sect. II two different metrics are used in the LivDet
competitions [11], [12]. The Average Classification Error Rate
(ACER) is defined as the average of the APCER and the
BPCER for a pre-defined decision threshold δ:
ACER (δ) =
APCER (δ) + BPCER (δ)
2
(1)
It should be noted that averaging APCER and BPCER has
been deprecated in ISO/IEC 30107-3. The ACER is reported
here for the only purpose to relate our results to the LiveDet
competition, where ACER has been used.
The detection accuracy (Acc.) refers to the rate of correctly
classified bona fide and PAs at δ = 0.5:
Acc (δ) =
1
# samples
·
{
(1−APCER (δ)) · {# PA samples}
+ (1− BPCER (δ)) · {# BF samples}
}
(2)
These will be used in Table II where needed.
4TABLE I: Summary of the most relevant methodologies for fingerprint PAD based on non-conventional sensors.
Year Spectrum Ref. Description Performance Database (# PAIs)
2008 430 – 630 nm [49] Wavelet transform APCER = 0.9% Unavailable DBBPCER = 0.5% (49)
2011
400 – 1650 nm [50] Spectroscopic properties - Unavailable DB(0)
OCT [34] - - Unavailable DB400 – 850 nm (-)
2018
1200 – 1550 nm
[43] Multi-spectral signatures APCER = 5.7% Unavailable DBBPCER = 0.0% (12)
[44] Pre-trained VGG19 model APCER = 0.0% Unavailable DBBPCER = 0.0% (12)
1310 nm (LSCI) [51] Texture descriptors APCER = 10.97% Unavailable DBBPCER = 0.84% (32)
A. Non-Conventional Fingerprint Sensors
To the best of our knowledge, the pioneering work on
fingerprint multi-spectral PAD with non-conventional capac-
itive or optical sensors was carried out by Rowe et al. in
[49]. The presented, and now widely used, Lumidigm sensor,
captures multi-spectral images in four different wavelengths
(i.e., 430, 530 and 630 nm, as well as white light). In
their work, the authors studied the PAD capabilities of the
combined images using absolute magnitudes of the responses
of each image to dual-tree complex wavelets. In a self-acquired
database including 49 PAI species, they obtained an APCER
of 0.9% for a BPCER of 0.5%. Even if these results are
remarkable, the PAD methods used are not described and not
many details about the acquired database or the experimental
protocol are presented. Therefore, it is difficult to establish a
fair benchmark.
Three years later, Hengfoss et al. analysed extensively the
spectroscopic properties of living against the cadaver fingers
using four wavelengths between 400 nm and 1630 nm [50].
However, no PAIs were analysed in their work. Later that year,
Chang et al. studied in [34] the complex properties of the
skin, which differentiate it from PAIs, using optical coherence
tomography (OCT) and nine different wavelengths between
400 nm and 850 nm. A single volunteer provided the bona
fide and PA samples, and not many details about the algorithms
used were reported.
More recently, in 2018, some preliminary PAD studies were
carried out in [43], [44] on a small database, comprising a
total of 60 samples and 12 different PAI species, which was
acquired at the University of South California within the BATL
project [52]. Gomez-Barrero et al. extracted multi-spectral
signatures from four different wavelengths in SWIR spectrum,
achieving an APCER = 5.7% and a BPCER = 0%. In this
case, all classification errors stem from a single PAI made with
orange playdoh. In a subsequent work on the same database,
Tolosana et al. used a pre-trained VGG19 CNN model [47]
for PAD purposes. In this case, all 60 samples were correctly
classified (i.e., APCER = BPCER = 0%).
Finally, Keilbach et al. analysed in [51] the PAD capabilities
of laser speckle contrast images (LSCI) over a larger database,
also acquired within the BATL project and comprising 32 PAIs
and more than 750 samples. In this case, several descriptors
were extracted from the LSCI sequences, including the well-
known local binary patterns (LBP) or the histogram of oriented
gradients (HOG). The final cascaded score level fusion yielded
an APCER = 10.97% for a BPCER = 0.84%.
B. Deep Learning for Conventional Sensors
The DL based fingerprint PAD proposed in the literature can
be widely classified depending on the input of the networks
into: i) using the full samples as input to the network, ii)
cropping the region of interest (ROI) and feeding it to the
network, and iii) extracting patches from the ROI as input.
Moreover, some articles iv) use the network for feature level
fusion of handcrafted descriptors. In the following, the main
studies in all categories are summarised.
Full samples. To the best of our knowledge, the first
work on fingerprint PAD based on deep learning algorithms
was presented in 2015 by Menotti et al. [53]. The authors
proposed two different CNN optimization approaches for the
particular purpose of PAD. On the one hand, the architecture
was optimized with feedforward convolutional operations and
hyperparameter optimization. On the other hand, the inner
weights of the network were optimized via back-propagation.
Both techniques were tested on iris, face and fingerprint
benchmarks, thus proving the generalisation capabilities of
the proposal. Their best fingerprint related results achieved an
average detection accuracy, Acc., across the four fingerprint
sensors of LivDet 2013 of 98.97%.
A year later, three different approaches were proposed.
Nogueira et al. [24] tested three different CNNs, namely: i)
the pre-trained VGG [47], ii) the pre-trained Alexnet [61],
and iii) a CNN with randomly initialised weights and trained
from scratch. They compared the ACER obtained with the
networks over the LivDet 2009, 2011 and 2013 databases
to a classical state-of-the-art algorithm based on LBP. In the
evaluation, the best detection performance is achieved using
a VGG pre-trained model and data augmentation (average
ACER = 2.9%), with a clear improvement with respect to
LBP (average ACER = 9.6%). It should be also noted, that the
ACER decreased between 25% and 50% (relative decrease) for
all three networks tested when data augmentation was used.
Then, Kim et al. analysed the use of deep belief net-
works based on superimposed restricted Boltzmann machines
(RBMs) [26]. The global network is trained in a two-stage
manner with layer-wise greedy training and fine-tuning with
5TABLE II: Summary of the most relevant methodologies for fingerprint PAD based on DL approaches.
Category Year Ref. Description Performance Database (# PAIs)
Full Sample
2015 [53] CNN optimization Acc. = 98.97% LivDet 2013(7)
2016
[24] Pre-trained CNNs ACER = 2.90% LivDet 2009-13(Best: VGG) (8)
[26] DBN with RBMs Acc. = 97.10% LivDet 2013(7)
[54] Pre-trained CNNs and Siamese networks Acc. = 96.60% LivDet 2011-13(Best: GoogLeNet) (8)
ROI 2017 [55] CNNs + ROI and PCA optimization ACER = 4.57% (2011) LivDet 2011-13and SVM classification ACER = 7.25% (2013) (8)
Patch-wise
2015 [56] DCNN (CiFar10-Net + FingerNet) ACER = 0.88% (2011) LivDet 2011-13ACER = 0.90% (2013) (8)
2016 [57] CNN trained from scratch ACER = 3.42% LivDet 2009(Identix, 3)
2017
[25] Contrast enhancement ACER = 0.20% ATVS FP+ Ad hoc CNN (2)
[28] Deep Boltzmann Machine Acc. = 85.96% LivDet 2013(7)
[27] Pre-trained AlexNet ACER = 4.63% (2011) LivDet 2011-13
+ Data augmentation and log-likelihood ACER = 1.90% (2013) (8)
[58] Deep triplet embedding ACER = 1.74% LivDet 2009-13(8)
2018
[29] Pre-trained MobileNet ACER = 0.96% LivDet 2011-15 (11)
+ Minutiae patches ACER = 2.00% Own DB (12)
[59] Fully CNN (SqueezeNet) ACER = 1.43% LivDet 2011-15+ Data augmentation (11)
Deep Fusion 2017 [60] Texture based features ACER ≈1.70% LivDet 2009-13and DNN fusion (8)
labelled inputs. On LivDet 2013, they achieved a detection
accuracy Acc. of 97.10%, noting again the considerable en-
hancement achieved with data augmentation.
Also Marasco et al. explored in [54] two different pre-
trained CNNs: i) CaffeNet [61], and ii) GoogLeNet [62].
Furthermore, the performance of such networks was compared
to a Siamese network, which optimised a metric distance
to yield high bona fide - PA distances and low bona fide
- bona fide distances. In a thorough evaluation on LivDet
2011 and 2013, a detection accuracy over 96% was achieved
for GoogLeNet, closely followed by the other networks. The
authors showed an accuracy decrease when dealing with either
unknown attack or a cross-sensor scenario.
ROI. In 2017, Yuan et al. followed a different approach
to optimise the performance of CNN models [55]. First, only
the ROI was fed to the network. Then, principal component
analysis (PCA) was introduced for each convolutional and
pooling operation in order to discard non-relevant information.
Finally, the output was classified with SVMs. This way, no
data augmentation was required to achieve a 4.57% ACER
over LivDet 2013, thereby outperforming other existing ap-
proaches.
Patch-wise. In 2015, a different two-step approach was
proposed by Wang et al. [56]. First, the ROI of the fingerprint
was segmented. Then, two deep CNNs (DCCNs) were used
in a patch-wise manner: i) the CiFar10-Net [63], and ii) the
self-developed Finger-Net, yielding an ACER under 1% over
LivDet 2011 and 2013.
In 2016, Park et al. extracted random patches from the
fingerprint samples and trained a CNN from scratch in [57],
achieving an ACER = 3.4% over the Identix subset of LiveDet
2009.
In 2017, Jang et al. proposed contrast enhancement and
block-wise processing of the fingerprint to improve the state
of the art results achieved with DL [25]. The blocks were then
combined with a majority voting rule. They also designed a
CNN from scratch inspired in the VGG19 model, and eval-
uated the proposed approach over the ATVS fake fingerprint
DB [64]. An ACER of 0.2% was reported.
Souza et al. analysed again in [28] the use of Boltzmann
machines, this time in a patch-wise manner and using a
majority vote rule. In particular, they used deep Boltzmann
machines (DBMs), which can learn more complex and internal
representations from a low number of labelled samples. The
accuracy obtained over LivDet 2013 was 85.96%.
Following this patch-wise trend, Toosi et al. tested in
[27] the accuracy of AlexNet with data augmentation. For
classification, the scores are calibrated using log-likelihood
ratios. The average ACER on LivDet 2011 and 2013 is 3.26%.
Similarly, Pala et al. tested the feasibility of using
deep triplet embedding for PAD purposes [58]. In contrast
to Siamese networks, this method requires no enrolment
database, since the triplets are selected from patches within the
input sample. Over LivDet 2009 to 2013, an ACER of 1.74%
was reported. The robustness to unknown attacks was also
evaluated on LivDet 2013, achieving ACERs much lower than
other approaches (e.g., 0.7% vs 1.4% for Siamese networks for
the modasil PAIs).
In 2018, Chugh et al. presented in [29] a different way
to extract fingerprint patches: around the minutiae. The idea
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Fig. 2: Finger sensor diagram. Left: a diagram of the inner components: two different sensors for the SWIR images and the
visible (VIS) light images, together with the corresponding LEDs. Right: a sample and the corresponding ROI for a bona fide
at 1200 nm.
behind this patch computation is the fact that PAIs can present
spurious minutiae, which can be surrounded by a distinct
texture. Therefore, these patches were fed to the MobileNet
pre-trained network [46]. The detection performance was
evaluated on LivDet 2011 to 2015, achieving a remarkable
ACER of 0.96% on average. However, the ACER increased to
2.0% for a self-acquired database, comprising a larger number
of PAIs (12).
In the same year, Park et al. developed in [59] a fully CNN
based on the Fire module of SqueezeNet [65]. They analysed
different patch sizes and compared the common voting method
to an optimal thresholding approach, which yielded a better
performance: an ACER of 1.43% over LivDet 2011 to 2015.
Deep fusion. Toosi et al. proposed in [60] a completely
different approach to use DL for fingerprint PAD. Instead
of using deep networks for feature extraction, ten different
hand-crafted descriptors, including the well-known local phase
quantization (LPQ), binary statistical features (BSIF) or scale
invariant feature transform (SIFT) were fed to a self-developed
deep network (Spidernet) for final fusion and classification.
The performance was compared to classical fusion approaches,
such as SVMs and AdaBoost, and ACER around 1.6-1.8%
were reported for LivDet 2009 to 2013.
IV. PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION METHODOLOGY:
HARDWARE
The finger SWIR capture device used for the present work
was developed within the BATL project [52] in cooperation
with our project partners. A general diagram of its inner
components is included in Fig. 2 (a). As it may be observed,
the camera and lens are placed inside a closed box, which
includes an open slot on the top. When the finger is placed
there, all ambient light is blocked and therefore only the
desired wavelengths are used for the acquisition. In particular,
we have used a Hamamatsu InGaAs SWIR sensor array,
which captures 64 × 64 px images, with a 25 mm fixed
focal length lens optimised for wavelengths within 900 – 1700
nm. More specifically, the following SWIR wavelengths were
selected for PAD purposes: λ1 = 1200 nm, λ2 = 1300 nm,
λ3 = 1450 nm, and λ4 = 1550 nm. These are similar to the
wavelengths considered in [32] for the skin vs. non-skin facial
classification.
An example of the acquired images for a bona fide sample
is shown in Fig. 2 (b) for the 1200 nm wavelength. As it
may be observed, before applying any PAD algorithm, the
region of interest (ROI) (i.e., the central finger-slot region
corresponding to the open slot where the finger is placed)
needs to be extracted from the background. Given that the
finger is always placed over the fixed open slot, and the camera
does not move, a simple fixed size cropping can be applied.
The ROI corresponding to Fig. 2 (b) with a size of 18 × 58
px is depicted in Fig. 2 (c).
Finally, the four samples acquired from two bona fides (a,
b) and three PAIs (c to e) fabricated with different materials
are included in Fig. 3: (c) a full yellow playdoh finger, (d)
a monster latex overlay, and (e) a glue overlay. As it may
be observed, the playdoh finger shows some similarities with
respect to the bona fide presentations (i.e., a similar change of
intensity across wavelengths), which will make the PAD task
harder. However, the change trend is completely different for
the other two PAIs, thereby making it easier to discriminate
them from bona fide presentations.
In addition to the SWIR images captured by the device,
fingerprint verification can be carried out with contactless
finger photos acquired in the visible spectrum with a 1.3 MP
camera and a 35 mm VIS-NIR lens, which are placed next to
the SWIR sensor within the closed box (see Fig. 2 (a)). Note
that the project sponsor IARPA has indicate that they make
the SWIR finger database available in the near future such that
research results presented in this paper can be reproduced.
V. PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION METHODOLOGY:
SOFTWARE
This section describes the state-of-the-art software methods
proposed in order to detect fingerprint PAs, as summarised in
Fig. 1. Two different approaches are studied: i) handcrafted
features, and ii) deep learning features. For both approaches,
the information provided by the sensor described in Sect. IV
is used as input.
7In general, it should be noted that each individual score
si generated by the individual PAD algorithms needs to be
transformed into a single range to allow the final fusion and
a fair benchmark. In compliance with the ISO/IEC 30107-2
standard on biometric presentation aattack detection – Part 2:
data formats [66], we define si ∈ [0, 100], where low values
close to 0 will represent bona fide presentations and high
values close to 100 will denote presentation attacks.
A. Handcrafted Features
As it was firstly proposed in [43], this method builds upon
the spectral signatures of the pixels across all four acquired
wavelengths, in order to capture the different properties at-
tributed to skin (i.e., bona fide presentation) and non-skin (i.e.,
PAI) materials. In particular, let us define the spectral signature
ss of a pixel with coordinates (x, y) as follows:
ss (x, y) = (i1, . . . , iN ) (3)
where in represents the intensity value of the pixel for the nth
wavelength λn. In our particular case study, N = 4.
However, such a representation is vulnerable to illumination
changes. Even if they have been minimised in the sensor
due to only having the finger slot open to the outer world,
thinner fingers for instance can let some tiny amounts of light
through. As a consequence, in order to achieve a signature
independent of the absolute brightness of the image at hand,
a normalised signature is computed. In addition, since our
final goal is to capture the distinct trends across different
wavelengths shown in Fig. 3 for the bona fides and the PAIs,
only differences between wavelengths will be used as final
handcrafted features. Therefore, the final normalised difference
vector d (x, y) of one pixel is computed as follows:
d [ia, ib] =
ia − ib
ia + ib
(4)
d (x, y) = {d [ia, ib]}a,b≤N,a6=b (5)
with −1 ≤ d [ia, ib] ≤ 1. In other words, the normalised
differences between all possible wavelength combinations are
computed. For our case study with N = 4, a total number
of six differences are calculated. These normalised difference
vectors d (x, y) will be used to classify skin vs. non-skin pixels
using an SVM.
The procedure so far performs a pixel wise classification.
Hence, the final score sss returned by the PAD method will
be the proportion of non-skin pixels of the sample ROI in a
range of 0 to 100.
B. Deep Learning Features
CNNs have been one of the most successful deep neural
network architectures in the last years. Some of their key
design principles were drawn from the findings of the Neu-
rophysiologists Nobel Prizes David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel
in the field of human vision [19]. Traditional (a.k.a. plain)
CNN based systems are mainly composed of convolutional and
pooling layers. The former extracts patterns from the images
through the application of several convolutions in parallel to
local regions of the images. These convolutional operations are
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Fig. 3: Examples of bona fides and PAs acquired by the SWIR
sensor and the final RGB image created for the input of the
deep neural network systems (see Eq. 6).
carried out by means of different kernels, adapted by the learn-
ing algorithm, and which assign a weight to each pixel of the
local region of the image depending on the type of patterns to
be extracted. Therefore, each kernel of one convolutional layer
is focused on extracting different patterns, such as horizontal
or vertical edges, over image patches whose size is determined
by the dimension of the layer. The output of these operations
produces a set of linear activations (a.k.a. feature map), which
serve as input to nonlinear activations, such as the rectified
linear activation function (ReLU). Finally, it is common to use
pooling layers to make the representation invariant to small
translations of the input. The pooling function replaces the
output of the network at a certain region with a statistical
summary of the nearby outputs, and facilitates the learning
convergence. For instance, the max-pooling function selects
the maximum value of the region.
As it was summarised in Fig. 1, in this study we explore
the potential of deep learning features in comparison to
handcrafted features by means of two different strategies: i)
using CNNs as an end-to-end approach (i.e., for both feature
extraction and classification), and ii) using CNNs as feature
extractors in combination with SVMs for classification. In
addition, two different training scenarios have been analysed,
namely: i) training CNN models from scratch, and ii) adapting
CNN pre-trained models.
For the input of the networks, and in order to consider the
8information provided by the four wavelengths captured by the
sensor, we need to build a single RGB image. To that end,
each dimension or channel of the RGB space will comprise
information stemming from different SWIR wavelengths or
combinations thereof. To maximise the discriminative power
of the input images, we analysed which wavelengths pro-
vided a higher inter-class (i.e., between bona fide and PA
presentations) and a lower intra-class (i.e., within the bona
fide presentation samples) variation in terms of the heatmaps
of the differences between samples. That is, to estimate the
inter-class variability we computed the pixel wise difference
of bona fide and PA samples, and for the intra-class variability,
the differences between bona fide samples. The former should
have high intensity values and the latter low values. After an
exhaustive analysis of the different possible combinations, we
defined the three dimensions as follows:
image (R,G,B) = (λ4 − λ1, λ4 − λ2, λ4 − λ3) (6)
Fig. 3 shows examples of bona fides and PAIs acquired by
the SWIR sensor and the final RGB image created following
Eq. 6. This RGB image will serve as input for the deep
neural network systems. All strategies have been implemented
under the Keras framework using Tensorflow as back-end,
with a NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 GPU. Adam optimizer
is considered with a learning rate value of 0.0001 and a loss
function based on binary cross-entropy. We now describe the
details of each of the deep learning strategies analysed in this
work.
1) Training CNN Models from Scratch: The first approach
is focused on training residual CNNs [45] from scratch.
These networks have outperformed traditional (a.k.a. plain)
networks in many different datasets such as ImageNet 2012
[67], CIFAR-10 [68], PASCAL VOC 2007/2012 [69] and
COCO [70] for both image classification and object detection
tasks. The peculiarity of this network is the insertion of
shortcut connections every few stacked layers, converting the
plain network into its residual version. This allows to use
deeper neural network architectures as well as accelerating
the training of the networks significantly [45], [71].
Our proposed residual CNN is depicted in Fig. 4 (left).
Batch normalization (BN) is applied right after each convo-
lution and before the activation following [72]. All activation
functions are based on ReLU apart from the Sigmoid activation
used in the last fully-connected layer, which provides output
scores between 0 and 100.
2) Adapting Pre-Trained CNN Models: The second ap-
proach evaluates the potential of state-of-the-art pre-trained
models for fingerprint PAD. In order to adapt the pre-trained
models to our task, we replace and retrain the classifier (i.e.,
the fully-connected layers), and adapt the weights of the last
convolutional layers to the fingerprint PAD task. The reason
for adapting only the last convolutional layers lies on the
fact that the first layers of the CNN extract more general
features related to directional edges and colours, whereas the
last layers of the network are in charge of extracting more
abstract features related to the specific task. We propose to
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Fig. 4: Proposed network architectures. Left: the residual CNN
trained from scratch using only the SWIR fingerprint database
(319,937 parameters). Middle: the pre-trained MobileNet-
based model (815,809 parameters). Right: the pre-trained
VGG-19-based model (20,155,969 parameters). Both middle
and right networks are adapted using transfer learning tech-
niques over the last white-background layers
use both MobileNet and VGG-19 network architectures pre-
trained using the ImageNet database [46], [47]. This database
contains more than one million images from 1000 different
classes, thereby allowing the extraction of very robust features
in the first layers [67].
Fig. 4 (middle) shows the architecture of our adapted
MobileNet network. This architecture has been modified
compared to the original version by removing some of the
last convolutional layers in order to reduce t e complexity
of the features extracted. Furthermore, the fully-connected
layers designed for the ImageNet classification task have been
also removed. This network is based on depthwise separable
convolutions, which factorize a standard convolution into: i)
a depthwise convolution, and ii) a 1x1 convolution called
9TABLE III: PAI species included in the experimental work
of this study. PAI species used only for testing and not for
training (i.e., unknown attacks) have been underlined.
Type Description
Dragon Skin Finger, conductive, conductive nanotips white, graphite
Latex Finger
Overlay Conductive silicone, monster latex, glue, silicone, urethane, wax, dragon skin
Playdoh Black, blue, green, orange, pink, purple, red, teal, yellow
Printed 2D photograph/matte paper, 3D normal/Ag paint,
Silicone Barepaint coating, finger flesh/yellow, graphite, normal, coating
Silly Putty Glow in the dark, normal, metallic
Wax Finger
pointwise convolution. Therefore, the depthwise convolution
applies a single filter to each input channel, and the pointwise
convolution subsequently applies a 1x1 convolution to com-
bine the outputs of the depthwise convolution [46]. Downsam-
pling is directly applied by the convolutional layers that have
a stride of 2 (represented by /2 in the convolutional layers of
Fig. 4). This network architecture allows to reduce both model
size and training/testing times, thus being a good solution for
mobile and embedded vision applications. It has been tested
in different datasets such as ImageNet [67], PlaNet [73] and
COCO [70] with state-of-the-art results.
Finally, Fig. 4 (right) shows the architecture of the adapted
VGG-19 network [47]. This architecture has also been mod-
ified replacing the last 3 fully-connected layers with 2 fully-
connected layers (with a final sigmoid activation). This net-
work architecture belongs to the family of traditional or plain
networks and appeared before the residual and MobileNet
configurations. Despite of that, and due to its simplicity,
it is one of the most used network architectures nowadays
providing very good results in many different competitions.
3) Using CNNs as Feature Extractors: In addition to the
end-to-end approaches described in Sect. V-B1 and V-B2,
we also analyse the potential of adapting and using all the
aforementioned CNNs (i.e., the residual CNN trained from
scratch, the adapted MobileNet CNN and the adapted VGG-19
CNN) as feature extractors. For this strategy, we consider the
same architecture networks described in Fig. 4, but removing
the last fully-connected layers in order to use only the features
provided by the last convolutional layer (after the Average
or Max pool layers, respectively). Then, these features are
transformed to the range [0, 1] and subsequently used to train
an SVM for final classification purposes.
C. Fused Approach
Finally, we analyse to which extent the proposed algo-
rithms complement each other to enhance the final fingerprint
PAD decisions. To that end, the algorithms are fused with a
weighted sum of the individual PAD scores as follows:
s = (1− α) · s1 + α · s2 (7)
where si with i ∈ {ss, res,mob,VGG} represent the individual
scores output by the approaches described above, α the fusion
weight, and s the final fusion score.
TABLE IV: Partition of training, validation and test datasets.
# Samples # PA Samples # BF Samples
Training set 260 130 130
Validation set 180 90 90
Test set 4293 222 4071
VI. EXPERIMENTAL FRAMEWORK
A. Database
The database considered in the experimental evaluation was
acquired within the BATL research project [52] in collabora-
tion with our partners at the Univiersity of South California
(USC). The project is financed by IARPA ODIN program [10].
Data were collected in two different stages and comprise both
bona fide and PA samples.
For the bona fide samples, a total of 163 subjects partic-
ipated during the first stage. For each of them, all 5 fingers
of the right hand were captured. For the second stage, there
were a total of 399 subjects. Index, middle and ring fingers of
both hands were captured from each subject. It is important to
highlight that people from different gender, ethnicity and age
were considered during the acquisition, in order to evaluate
the systems and algorithms in realistic conditions.
For the PA samples, the selection of the PAI fabrication
materials was based on the requirements of IARPA ODIN
program evaluation, covering the most challenging PAIs [14],
[15]. There are a total of 35 different PAI species, which
can be further categorized into eight main groups, namely:
dragon skin, latex, overlay, playdoh, printed fingers, silicone,
silly putty and wax. All details are included in Table III.
Finally, all captured samples were manually reviewed in
order to remove all samples with operational errors (e.g., finger
movement) or hardware failures, ending up with a total of
4,290 and 443 bona fide and PA samples, respectively.
B. Experimental Protocol
The main goal behind the experimental protocol design
was to analyse and prove the soundness of our proposed
fingerprint PAD approach in a realistic scenario. Therefore,
the database described in the previos section is split into non-
overlapping training, validation and test datasets, following
the same procedure considered in previous works [45], [47].
All details are shown in Table IV. In order to allow a fair
benchmark among the approaches described in Sect. V, the
same partitions will be used for all the experiments.
For the development of our proposed fingerprint PAD meth-
ods, both training and validation datasets are used in order to
train the weights of the systems and select the optimal network
architectures. For the training dataset, we consider a total of
130 samples for each class (i.e., bona fide and PA), whereas
for the validation dataset the number of samples is reduced to
90 per class. It is important to highlight that the same number
of samples per class are considered during the development
of the systems in order to avoid bias towards one class.
For the final evaluation, the test dataset comprises the
remaining bona fide and PA samples not used during the de-
velopment of the systems, thereby allowing a fair performance
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Fig. 5: Performance evaluation of: (a) all the individual systems, (b) the fusion of handcrafted features (SS, Sect. V-A) and
end-to-end deep learning approaches (MobileNet and VGG19, Sect. V-B), and (v) the fusion of end-to-end deep learning
approaches (ResNet, MobileNet and VGG19, Sect. V-B).
analysis. A total of 4070 and 223 bona fide and PA samples
are considered, respectively.
Moreover, it is important to remark that the test dataset
includes 5 unkown PAIs, which were not considered during
the development stages (i.e., they are not present either in
the train or in the validation set). This way, the robustness of
the proposed methods to unknown attacks can be evaluated,
thereby modelling realistic scenarios. These unknown attacks
are underlined in Table III.
Based on these partitions, three different sets of experiments
are carried out:
A. Exp 1 - Handcrafted features: first, the performance of the
handcrafted features described in Sect. V-A is evaluated.
B. Exp 2 - Deep learning features: then, we evaluate the per-
formance of each deep learning based approach described
in Sect. V-B (i.e., end-to-end and feature-extraction +
SVM classification, CNNs trained from scratch and trans-
fer learning), and establish a fair benchmark by following
the same experimental protocol.
C. Exp 3 - Fused system: in the last set of experiments, the
score level fusion (see Sect. V-C) of the aforementioned
systems will be evaluated, in order to determine the best
performing configuration and assess the complementarity
of the individual algorithms.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Exp 1 - Handcrafted Features
Fig. 5a shows the DET curves of each of the individual
methods proposed in this study. As it may be observed, the
spectral signature pixel wise approach has achieved a 12.61%
D-EER. Compared to the results first reported in [43] (APCER
= 5.6% and BPCER = 0%), there is a clear decrease in the
detection performance. This is due to the preliminary character
of the first study, over a small database comprising only
60 samples and 12 different PAI species. In this work, the
more thorough evaluation unveils the main drawbacks of the
approach: it is not possible to get an APCER ≤ 2%, and for
APCER ≈ 5%, the BPCER is over 20% (i.e., the system is
not convenient any more).
B. Exp 2 - Deep Learning Features
Deep learning strategies have considerably improved the
results achieved using handcrafted features (see Fig. 5a for
a comparison). In general, the features extracted by the neural
network models provide a higher discriminative power and
generalization to new samples (note that during the devel-
opment of the systems, all strategies were able to achieve
loss values very close to zero for both training and validation
datasets).
For the case of training end-to-end residual CNN models
from scratch, the best result obtained is a 2.25% D-EER. This
result outperforms the handcrafted feature approach by relative
improvement of 82%. Furthermore, low APCERs below 1%
can be achieved for BPCERs below 8%, thereby overcoming
the main drawback of the handcrafted features. Similarly,
for high convenient systems with BPCERs under 1%, the
APCER ranges between 4 and 15%. These facts highlight the
potential of incorporating residual connections to plain CNNs,
being able to easily train neural network models without the
necessity of having thousands of labelled images for each
class, but only 130 (see Table IV).
Very good results have been also obtained for the use of pre-
trained CNN models. In particular, the proposed MobileNet-
and VGG19-based models have obtained state-of-the-art re-
sults with final values of 1.80% and 1.35% D-EER, respec-
tively. These results have further improved the results obtained
using handcrafted features, achieving an average relative im-
provement of 86% and 89%, respectively.
In addition, it is important to note that, even though an
improvement at the D-EER operating point can be achieved
using these end-to-end pre-trained models in combination to
transfer learning techniques, with respect to training a network
from scratch, this does not hold for all operating points. If
we take a closer look at Fig. 5a, we can observe that for
low BPCERs (i.e., high convenience), the best performing
approach is the residual CNN trained from scratch. On the
contrary, the lowest BPCERs for APCER ≤ 2% (i.e., high
security) are achieved by the VGG19 pre-trained model.
However, it should be noted that the VGG19 based system
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Fig. 6: Examples of the features extracted in the first convolutional layer (64 filters) of the VGG19-based model from the
samples depicted in Fig. 3.
cannot reach BPCERs under 1%, which can be done using the
pre-trained MobileNet model. Therefore, even if depending on
the final application, some CNN approaches might be more
suitable than others, the ResNet inspired approach achieves
overall the best performance.
For completeness, we also analyse the potential of using
CNNs as feature extractors in combination with the SVM
classifiers. This way, we can also analyse the improvement
achieved using deep learning features compared to the hand-
crafted features, which were also classified using SVMs. The
performance in terms of APCER and BPCER is summarised
in Table V (note that the SVMs output a single binary decision
for the CNN features instead of a score). As it may be
observed, the operating points are always contained within the
DET curves reported in Fig. 5a, which means that no further
improvement has been achieved using the SVM classification
with respect to the last fully-connected sigmoid activation
layer of the end-to-end CNNs. Therefore, in the remaining
experiments, only the end-to-end CNNs will be considered.
On the other hand, the advantages of the learned features with
respect to the handcrafted approach are further confirmed.
All these results show the potential of using CNNs in
combination with SWIR images for fingerprint PAD purposes,
and the robustness of the features extracted. Fig. 6 shows some
examples of the features extracted in the first convolutional
layer (64 filters) of the VGG19-based model for bona fide and
PA samples. In general, very different features ar extracted
for bona fide and PA samples. This fact can be easily observed
when considering overlays based on monster latex and glue,
Fig. 6 (d) and (e), respectively. However, the features extracted
for the network when considering other materials such as
yellow playdoh (Fig. 6 (c)) seem more similar to the bona
fide samples (Fig. 6 (a) and (b)), indicating the difficulty of
the task.
C. Exp 2 - Deep Learning: Robustness to Unkown Attacks
Finally, we have also studied the robustness and generalisa-
tion capacity of the deep learning methods to new PAIs (a.k.a.
TABLE V: Performance evaluation of the deep learning feature
extractors in combination with the SVM classifiers.
BPCER (%) APCER (%)
Residual CNN 3.37 1.35
MobileNet-Based Model 5.33 0.45
VGG19-Based Model 1.89 0.90
unknown attacks). In order to do that, 30 samples acquired
from five out of the 35 total PAIs available in the database
(see Table III) were considered only for testing the systems
(i.e., none of those PAI samples where included in the training
and validation datasets). The reason behind this particular PAI
selection is twofold. On the one hand, we chose one PAI
species from each row or type on Table III, to increase the
variability also in the unknown attacks. On the other hand, we
selected the PAI species with the smallest number of samples
available, in order to maximise the number of training samples
and hence the detection performance.
In general, very good results have been achieved for all
methods. At the D-EER operating point, for the residual CNN
and MobileNet-based models only one sample from a yellow
playdoh finger has been misclassified, whereas for the case
of using the VGG19-based model, all 30 samples stemming
from the unknown attacks have been correctly classified. On
the other hand, none of the three samples acquired from
the yellow playdoh finger were detected by the handcrafted
features, which were able to detect the remaining four PAIs.
This proves the robustness f the proposed methods to even
unknown attacks, which may appear in the future.
D. Exp 3 - Fused Systems
In order to further enhance the results achieved by individual
methods, and analyse to which degree the systems complement
each other, we study in this last set of experiments the fusion
of multiple systems at score level. In all cases, the performance
has been optimised in terms of the D-EER for values of
α ∈ [0, 1] (see Eq. 7), where this α weight corresponds to
the second system referred to in the legend.
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First, the fusion of handcrafted and deep learning features
is evaluated in Fig. 5b. Only the fusions with the systems
based on MobileNet and VGG-19 are depicted, since no
improvement was achieved for the fusion of the residual
net and the spectral signatures with respect to the individual
CNN. As it could be expected given the big performance
gap between the spectral signatures based PAD and the deep
learning counterparts, the score level fusion yields a minimum
improvement with respect to the CNNs only in two cases: i)
for either low BPCER ≤ 0.5% or low APCER ≤ 0.5% for the
MobileNet approach (dashed yellow vs solid purple curves),
and for ii) BPCER ≤ 1% for the VGG19 network (dashed
orange vs solid green curves).
Afterwards, the three CNN based approaches have been
fused in a two-by-two basis (the fusion of all three systems
showed no further improvement), and the best performing
fusions are depicted in Fig. 5c. As it may be observed, no
further improvements have been achieved for the operating
point around the D-EER. However, for APCER ≤ 0.5%, the
corresponding BPCER values for the fused systems (solid
lines) are significantly lower than those of the individual
networks (dashed lines): close to 2% for the fusions with
VGG-19 instead of between 5% and 15% (i.e., close to a 90%
relative improvement). That yields convenient systems (i.e.,
low BPCER) even for highly secure (i.e., very low APCER)
scenarios. On the other hand, for low BPCER ≤ 1%, the
best APCER (≤ 10%) is achieved for either the residual
CNN alone (dashed dark blue) or its fusion with the VGG-19
inspired (solid green). In this last case, taking a closer look
at the individual PAD scores, we can see that both networks
complement each other. Lastly, if we compare Figs. 5b and 5c,
we observe a superior performance in the latter case, thereby
further supporting the fact that CNNs can perform better than
the baseline handcrafted fusion in this task.
All in all, we can conclude that a remarkable performance
can be achieved for fingerprint PAD using SWIR images and
the fusion of two CNN models: a residual CNN trained from
scratch and a pre-trained VGG-19 CNN. A D-EER as low as
1.36% can be reached, which is lower to the most similar study
in the literature (ACER = 2% in [29]). Furthermore, other
operating points yield a BPCER of 2% for APCER ≤ 0.5%,
and an APCER ≈ 7% for BPCER = 0.1%. In addition, the
fused system was able to correctly detect all unknown attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have presented a fingerprint PAD scheme
based on i) a new capture device for the acquisition of finger
samples in the SWIR spectrum, and ii) state-of-the-art deep
learning techniques. An in depth analysis of several networks,
either trained from scratch or using transfer learning over pre-
trained models, and either as end-to-end solutions or as feature
extractors in combination with SVMs for classification, has
revealed the soundness of the proposed approach.
Three different CNN architectures have been tested: a resid-
ual CNN trained from scratch [45], [71], and the adaptation
of the final layers of the VGG-19 [47] and the MobileNet
[46] pre-trained models. In addition, the performance of the
proposed DL approaches has been benchmarked against the
only handcrafted approach for fingerprint PAD based on SWIR
images available in the literature [43]. The performance of
all the individual algorithms has been tested over a database
comprising more than 4700 samples, stemming from 562
different subjects and 35 different PAI species. Furthermore,
several score level fusion schemes have been evaluated. The
experimental protocol was designed to simulate a real life
scenario: only 260 samples were used for training, and 30
samples acquired from 5 PAI species were excluded from the
development stages and utilised only for testing (i.e., unkown
attack scenario).
In the aforementioned conditions, the best performance was
reached for the fusion of two end-to-end CNNs: the residual
CNN trained from scratch and the adapted VGG19 pre-trained
model. A D-EER of 1.35% was obtained. Moreover, this
system can be used for different applications. On the one hand,
if high user convenience is preferred, an APCER around 7%
can be achieved for a BPCER of 0.1% (i.e., only 1 in 1000
bona fide samples will be rejected). On the other hand, for
highly secure scenarios, a BPCER of 2% can be achieved
for any APCER under 0.5%. These results clearly outperform
those achieved with the handcrafted features, which yielded
a D-EER over 12% and had trouble reaching APCERs under
2%.
We may thus conclude, that the use of SWIR images in
combination with state-of-the-art CNNs offers a reliable and
efficient solution to the threat posed by presentation attacks.
However, the development of new countermeasures usually
brings the corresponding development of new attacks, in this
case, new PAI species. To tackle them, we plan to fuse the
techniques developed in this work, which analyse the surface
of the finger within the SWIR spectrum, with other approaches
analysing bona fide properties below the skin [51], [74].
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research is based upon work supported in part by the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) under contract number
2017-17020200005. The views and conclusions contained herein are
those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily
representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of
ODNI, IARPA, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is
authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental
purposes notwithstanding any copyright annotation therein.
This work was supported by the German Federal Ministry of
Education and Research (BMBF) as well as by the Hessen State
Ministry for Higher Education, Research and the Arts (HMWK)
within the Center for Research in Security and Privacy (CRISP, www.
crisp-da.de), and by the projects Cognimetrics (TEC2015-70627-
R MINECO/FEDER) and Bio-Guard (Ayudas Fundacion BBVA a
Equipos de Investigacion Cientfica 2017).
This work was carried out during an internship of R. Tolosana at
da/sec. R. Tolosana is supported by a FPU Fellowship from Spanish
MECD.
REFERENCES
[1] Government of India, “Unique identification authority of india,” 2012.
[Online]. Available: https://uidai.gov.in/
[2] European Comission, “Smart borders,” 2013. [Online].
Available: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/
borders-and-visas/smart-borders/index en.htm
13
[3] A. Zwiesele, A. Munde, C. Busch, and H. Daum, “BioIS study -
comparative study of biometric identification systems,” in 34th Annual
2000 IEEE Intl. Carnahan Conf. on Security Technology (CCST). IEEE
Computer Society, 2000, pp. 60–63.
[4] N. Ratha, J. Connell, and R. Bolle, “Enhancing security and privacy in
biometrics-based authentication systems,” IBM Systems Journal, vol. 40,
2001.
[5] ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics, ISO/IEC 30107-1. Information Tech-
nology - Biometric presentation attack detection, International Organi-
zation for Standardization, 2016.
[6] S. Marcel, M. S. Nixon, and S. Z. Li, Eds., Handbook of Biometric
Anti-Spoofing. Springer, 2014.
[7] A. Hadid, N. Evans, S. Marcel, and J. Fierrez, “Biometrics systems
under spoofing attack: an evaluation methodology and lessons learned,”
IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 20–30, 2015.
[8] TABULA RASA, “Trusted biometrics under spoofing attacks,” 2010.
[Online]. Available: http://www.tabularasa-euproject.org/
[9] BEAT, “Biometrics evaluation and testing,” 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://www.beat-eu.org/
[10] ODNI and IARPA, “IARPA-BAA-16-04 (thor),” 2016. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/odin/odin-baa
[11] L. Ghiani, D. A. Yambay, V. Mura, G. L. Marcialis et al., “Review of
the fingerprint liveness detection (LivDet) competition series: 2009 to
2015,” Image and Vision Computing, vol. 58, pp. 110–128, 2017.
[12] V. Mura, G. Orru`, R. Casula, A. Sibiriu et al., “LivDet 2017 fingerprint
liveness detection competition 2017,” in Proc. Int. Conf on Biometrics
(ICB), 2018.
[13] J. Galbally and M. Gomez-Barrero, “Presentation attack detection in
iris recognition,” in Iris and Periocular Biometrics, C. Busch and
C. Rathgeb, Eds. IET, Aug. 2017.
[14] E. Marasco and A. Ross, “A survey on antispoofing schemes for
fingerprint recognition systems,” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR),
vol. 47, no. 2, p. 28, 2015.
[15] C. Sousedik and C. Busch, “Presentation attack detection methods for
fingerprint recognition systems: A survey,” IET Biometrics, vol. 3, no. 1,
pp. 1–15, January 2014.
[16] J. Galbally, S. Marcel, and J. Fierrez, “Biometric antispoofing methods:
A survey in face recognition,” IEEE Access, vol. 2, pp. 1530–1552,
2014.
[17] R. Tolosana, R. Vera-Rodriguez, J. Fierrez, and J. Ortega-Garcia, Hand-
book of Biometric Anti-Spoofing (2nd Edition). Springer, 2018, ch.
Presentation Attacks in Signature Biometrics: Types and Introduction to
Attack Detection.
[18] R. Raghavendra, M. Avinash, S. Marcel, and C. Busch, “Finger vein
liveness detection using motion magnification,” in Proc. Int. Conf. on
Biometrics Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS), 2015, pp. 1–7.
[19] I. Goodfellow, Y. Bengio, and A. Courville, Deep Learning. MIT Press,
2016.
[20] I. Sutskever, O. Vinyals, and Q.-V. Le, “Sequence to sequence learning
with neural networks,” in Proc. Advances in neural information process-
ing systems (NIPS), 2014.
[21] B. Zhou, A. Khosla et al., “Learning deep features for discriminative
localization,” in Proc. Int. Conf. on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition (CVPR), 2016.
[22] A. Rattani and R. Derakhshani, “On fine-tuning convolutional neural
networks for smartphone based ocular recognition,” in Proc. Int. Joint
Conf. on Biometrics (IJCB), 2017.
[23] R. Tolosana, R. Vera-Rodriguez et al., “Exploring recurrent neural
networks for on-line handwritten signature biometrics,” IEEE Access,
pp. 1 – 11, 2018.
[24] R.-F. Nogueira, R. de Alencar Lotufo, and R. C. Machado, “Fingerprint
liveness detection using convolutional neural networks,” IEEE Trans. on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 1206–1213, 2016.
[25] H.-U. Jang, H.-Y. Choi et al., “Fingerprint spoof detection using contrast
enhancement and convolutional neural networks,” in Proc. Int. Conf. on
Information Science and Applications (ICISA), 2017, pp. 331–338.
[26] S. Kim, B. Park et al., “Deep belief network based statistical feature
learning for fingerprint liveness detection,” Pattern Recognition Letters,
vol. 77, pp. 58–65, 2016.
[27] A. Toosi, S. Cumani, and A. Bottino, “CNN patch-based voting for
fingerprint liveness detection,” in Proc. Int. Joint Conf. on Computational
Intelligence (IJCCI), 2017.
[28] G. B. Souza, D. Santos, R. G. Pires, A. N. Marana, and J. P. Papa, “Deep
boltzmann machines for robust fingerprint spoofing attack detection,” in
Proc. Int. Joint Conf. on Neural Networks (IJCNN), 2017, pp. 1863–
1870.
[29] T. Chugh, K. Cao, and A.-K. Jain, “Fingerprint spoof buster: Use of
minutiae-centered patches,” IEEE Trans. on Information Forensics and
Security, vol. 13, no. 9, pp. 2190–2202, 2018.
[30] O. Kanich, M. Drahansky`, and M. Me´zl, “Use of creative materials for
fingerprint spoofs,” in Proc. Int. Workshop on Biometrics and Forensics
(IWBF), 2018.
[31] Y. Wang, X. Hao et al., “A new multispectral method for face liveness
detection,” in Proc. ACPR, 2013, pp. 922–926.
[32] H. Steiner, S. Sporrer et al., “Design of an active multispectral SWIR
camera system for skin detection and face verification,” Journal of
Sensors, vol. 2016, 2016.
[33] R.-K. Rowe, K.-A. Nixon, and P.-W. Butler, Multispectral Fingerprint
Image Acquisition. Springer London, 2008, pp. 3–23.
[34] S. Chang, K. Larin et al., “Fingerprint spoof detection by NIR optical
analysis,” in State of the Art in Biometrics. InTech, 2011, pp. 57–84.
[35] A. Lumini and L. Nanni, “Fair comparison of skin detection approaches
on publicly available datasets,” arXiv:1802.02531v1, Feb. 2018.
[36] J. A. Jacquez, J. Huss, W. McKeehan, J. M. Dimitroff, and H. F.
Kuppenheim, “Spectral reflectance of human skin in the region 0.7–2.6
µ,” Journal of Applied Physiology, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 297–299, 1955.
[37] R. S. Ghiass, O. Arandjelovic´, A. Bendada, and X. Maldague, “In-
frared face recognition: A comprehensive review of methodologies and
databases,” Pattern Recognition, vol. 47, no. 9, pp. 2807–2824, 2014.
[38] T. Bourlai, Face recognition across the imaging spectrum. Springer,
2016.
[39] T. Bourlai, N. Kalka, A. Ross, B. Cukic, and L. Hornak, “Cross-spectral
face verification in the short wave infrared (SWIR) band,” in Proc. Int.
Conf. Pattern Recognition (ICPR), 2010, pp. 1343–1347.
[40] F. Nicolo and N. A. Schmid, “Long range cross-spectral face recog-
nition: matching SWIR against visible light images,” IEEE Trans. on
Information Forensics and Security, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 1717–1726, 2012.
[41] N. Narang and T. Bourlai, “Face recognition in the SWIR band when
using single sensor multi-wavelength imaging systems,” Image and
Vision Computing, vol. 33, pp. 26–43, 2015.
[42] M. A. Ferrer, A. Morales, and A. Dı´az, “An approach to SWIR
hyperspectral hand biometrics,” Information Sciences, vol. 268, pp. 3–
19, 2014.
[43] M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Kolberg, and C. Busch, “Towards fingerprint
presentation attack detection based on short wave infrared imaging and
spectral signatures,” in Proc. Norwegian Information Security Conf.
(NISK), Sep. 2018.
[44] R. Tolosana, M. Gomez-Barrero, J. Kolberg, A. Morales, C. Busch, and
J. Ortega, “Towards fingerprint presentation attack detection based on
convolutional neural networks and short wave infrared imaging,” in Proc.
Int. Conf. of the Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG), Sep. 2018.
[45] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun, “Deep residual learning for image
recognition,” CoRR, vol. abs/1512.03385, 2015.
[46] A. Howard, M. Zhu, B. Chen, D. Kalenichenko, W. Wang, T. Weyand,
M. Andreetto, and H. Adam, “MobileNets: Efficient Convolu-
tional Neural Networks for mobile vision applications,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1704.04861, 2017.
[47] K. Simonyan and A. Zisserman, “Very deep convolutional networks
for large-scale image recognition,” in Proc. Int. Conf. on Learning
Representations (ICLR), 2015.
[48] ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics, ISO/IEC FIDS 30107-3. Information
Technology - Biometric presentation attack detection - Part 3: Testing
and Reporting, International Organization for Standardization, 2017.
[49] R.-K. Rowe, K.-A. Nixon, and P.-W. Butler, Multispectral Fingerprint
Image Acquisition. Springer London, 2008, pp. 3–23.
[50] C. Hengfoss, A. Kulcke, G. Mull, C. Edler et al., “Dynamic liveness
and forgeries detection of the finger surface on the basis of spectroscopy
in the 400–1650 nm region,” Forensic science international, vol. 212,
no. 1-3, pp. 61–68, 2011.
[51] P. Keilbach, J. Kolberg, M. Gomez-Barrero, and C. Busch, “Fingerprint
presentation attack detection using laser speckle contrast imaging,” in
Proc. Int. Conf. of the Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG), Sep.
2018.
[52] BATL, “Biometric authentication with a timeless learner,” 2017.
[53] D. Menotti, G. Chiachia et al., “Deep representations for iris, face, and
fingerprint spoofing detection,” IEEE Trans. on Information Forensics
and Security, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 864–879, 2015.
[54] E. Marasco, P. Wild, and B. Cukic, “Robust and interoperable fingerprint
spoof detection via convolutional neural networks,” in Proc. Int. Conf.
on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 2016, pp. 1–6.
[55] C. Yuan, X. Li, Q. Wu, J. Li, and X. Sun, “Fingerprint liveness detection
from different fingerprint materials using convolutional neural network
14
and principal component analysis,” Computers, Materials & Continua,
vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 357–372, 2017.
[56] C. Wang, K. Li, Z. Wu, and Q. Zhao, “A DCNN based fingerprint
liveness detection algorithm with voting strategy,” in Proc. Chinese Conf.
on Biometric Recognition (CCBR). Springer, 2015, pp. 241–249.
[57] E. Park, W. Kim, Q. Li, J. Kim, and H. Kim, “Fingerprint liveness
detection using CNN features of random sample patches,” Proc. Int.
Conf. of the Biometrics Special Interest Group (BIOSIG), 2016.
[58] F. Pala and B. Bhanu, “On the accuracy and robustness of deep triplet
embedding for fingerprint liveness detection,” in IProc. Int. Conf. on
Immage Processing (ICIP). IEEE, 2017, pp. 116–120.
[59] E. Park, X. Cui, W. Kim, J. Liu, and H. Kim, “Patch-based fake finger-
print detection using a fully convolutional neural network with a small
number of parameters and an optimal threshold,” arXiv:1803.07817,
Mar. 2018.
[60] A. Toosi, A. Bottino, S. Cumani, P. Negri, and P. L. Sottile, “Feature
fusion for fingerprint liveness detection: a comparative study,” IEEE
Access, vol. 5, pp. 23 695–23 709, 2017.
[61] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and E. Geoffrey, “ImageNet classification
with deep convolutional neural networks,” in Advances in Neural In-
formation Processing Systems 25. Curran Associates, Inc., 2012, pp.
1097–1105.
[62] C. Szegedy, W. Liu, Y. Jia, P. Sermanet et al., “Going deeper with con-
volutions,” in Proc. Conf. on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
(CVPR), 2015, pp. 1–9.
[63] L. Wan, M. Zeiler, S. Zhang, Y. L. Cun, and R. Fergus, “Regularization
of neural networks using dropconnect,” in Proc. Int. Conf. on Machine
Learning (ICML), 2013, pp. 1058–1066.
[64] J. Galbally, J. Fierrez et al., “Evaluation of direct attacks to fingerprint
verification systems,” Telecommunication Systems, vol. 47, no. 3-4, pp.
243–254, 2011.
[65] F. N. Iandola, S. Han, M. W. Moskewicz, K. Ashraf et al., “Squeezenet:
Alexnet-level accuracy with 50x fewer parameters and ¡ 0.5 mb model
size,” arXiv:1602.07360, 2016.
[66] ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 Biometrics, ISO/IEC DIS 30107-2. Information
Technology - Biometric presentation attack detection - Part 2: Data
formats, International Organization for Standardization, 2017.
[67] O. Russakovsky, J. Deng, H. Su, J. Krause, S. Satheesh, S. Ma,
Z. Huang, A. Karpathy, A. Khosla, M. Bernstein, A. Berg, and
F. Li, “Imagenet large scale visual recognition challenge,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1409.0575, 2014.
[68] A. Krizhevsky and G. Hinton, “Learning multiple layers of features from
tiny images,” Technical report, University of Toronto, vol. 1, no. 4, 2009.
[69] M. Everingham, L. Gool, C. Williams, J. Winn, and A. Zisserman, “The
pascal visual object classes (voc) challenge,” International Journal of
Computer Vision, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 303–338, 2010.
[70] T. Lin, M. Maire, S. Belongie, L. Bourdev, R. Girshick, J. Hays,
P. Perona, D. Ramanan, P. Dolla´r, and C. Zitnick, “Microsoft COCO:
common objects in context,” CoRR, vol. abs/1405.0312, 2014.
[71] C. Szegedy, S. Ioffe, and V. Vanhoucke, “Inception-v4, inception-
resnet and the impact of residual connections on learning,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1602.07261, 2016.
[72] S. Ioffe and C. Szegedy, “Batch normalization: Accelerating deep
network training by reducing internal covariate shift,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1502.03167, 2015.
[73] T. Weyand, I. Kostrikov, and J. Philbin, “Planet - photo geolocation with
convolutional neural networks,” CoRR, vol. abs/1602.05314, 2016.
[74] J. Kolberg, M. Gomez-Barrero, S. Venkatesh, R. Raghavendra, and
C. Busch, “Presentation attack detection with vein recognition,” in
Handbook of Vascular Biometrics, S. Marcel, A. Uhl, R. Veldhuis, and
C. Busch, Eds., 2019, to appear.
Ruben Tolosana received the M.Sc. degree in
Telecommunication Engineering in 2014 from Uni-
versidad Autonoma de Madrid. In April 2014, he
joined the Biometrics and Data Pattern Analytics -
BiDA Lab at the Universidad Autonoma de Madrid,
where he is currently collaborating as an Assistant
Researcher pursuing the Ph.D. degree. Since then,
Ruben has been granted with several awards such as
the FPU research fellowship from Spanish MECD
(2015), and the European Biometrics Industry Award
(2018). His research interests are mainly focused
on signal and image processing, pattern recognition, deep learning, and
biometrics, particularly in the areas of handwriting and handwritten signature.
He is author of several publications and also collaborates as a reviewer in
many different international conferences (e.g. ICDAR, ICB, EUSIPCO, etc)
and high-impact journals (e.g. IEEE Transactions of Information Forensics
and Security, IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, ACM Computing Surveys,
etc). Finally, he has participated in several National and European projects
focused on the deployment of biometric security through the world.
Marta Gomez-Barrero received her MSc degrees
in Computer Science and Mathematics, and her PhD
degree in Electrical Engineering, from Universidad
Autonoma de Madrid, in 2011 and 2016, respec-
tively. Since 2016 she is a PostDoctoral researcher
at the Center for Research in Security and Privacy
(CRISP), Germany. Her current research focuses
on the development of privacy-enhancing biometric
technologies as well as Presentation Attack Detec-
tion methods, within the wider fields of pattern
recognition and machine learning. She has been
actively involved in international projects dealing with vulnerability evaluation
of biometric systems, including the EU FP7 projects Tabula Rasa and BEAT,
or the BATL project within the US IARPA Odin Program. She is also the
recipient of a number of distinctions, including: EAB European Biometric
Industry Award 2015, Best Ph.D. Thesis Award by Universidad Autonoma de
Madrid 2015/16, Siew-Sngiem Best Paper Award at ICB 2015, Archimedes
Award for young researches from Spanish Ministry of Education in 2013 and
Best Poster Award at ICB 2013.
Christoph Busch received the Diploma degree
from the Technical University of Darmstadt (TUD),
Darmstadt, Germany, and the Ph.D. degree in com-
puter graphics from TUD, in 1997. He joined the
Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics, Darm-
stadt, in 1997. He is a member of the Faculty of
Computer Science and Media Technology with the
Norwegian University of Science and Technology,
Norway, and holds a joint appointment with the
Faculty of Computer Science, Hochschule Darm-
stadt. Furthermore, he lectures a course on biometric
systems with DTU in Copenhagen since 2007. His research includes pattern
recognition, multimodal and mobile biometrics, and privacy enhancing tech-
nologies for biometric systems. He is Cofounder of the European Association
for Biometrics and convener of WG3 in ISO/IEC JTC1 SC37 on Biomet-
rics. He coauthored over 400 technical papers, and has been a speaker at
international conferences.
15
Javier Ortega-Garcia received the M.Sc. degree in
electrical engineering and the Ph.D. degree (cum
laude) in electrical engineering from Universidad
Politcnica de Madrid, Spain, in 1989 and 1996,
respectively. He is currently a Full Professor at the
Signal Processing Chair in Universidad Autnoma de
Madrid - Spain, where he holds courses on biometric
recognition and digital signal processing. He is a
founder and Director of the BiDA-Lab, Biometrics
and Data Pattern Analytics Group. He has authored
over 300 international contributions, including book
chapters, refereed journal, and conference papers. His research interests are
focused on biometric pattern recognition (online signature verification, speaker
recognition, human-device interaction) for security, e-health and user profiling
applications. He chaired Odyssey-04, The Speaker Recognition Workshop,
ICB-2013, the 6th IAPR International Conference on Biometrics, and ICCST-
2017, the 51st IEEE International Carnahan Conference on Security Technol-
ogy.
